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Chapter 14
Mediation and Conciliation in Collective
Labor Conflicts in the United Kingdom
Kristina Potocˇnik, Sara Chaudhry and Marta Bernal-Valencia
The Case
Employment Relations in Scottish Refinery—Background
In 2008, 1200 workers at one of the Scottish oil refineries held a 48-h strike.
Employees, members of a large trade union, were seeking to protect their
existing pension scheme. The company’s majority shareholder came to terms
with the trade union. In October 2013, he halted production (initially as a
safety measure preceding strike action) and additionally initiated a lockout
even after strike action had been called off. Furthermore, he bypassed the union
by offering individual employees deals capitalizing on their fear of losing their
jobs.
Position of Parties Involved—A Historical Overview
Two key disputes, involving the same stakeholders, emerged in this specific
organizational context. In 2008, the trade union claimed that the company had
already reduced its contributions to the pension scheme by introducing finan-
cial penalties for early retirement. The existence of a non-contributory pension
scheme was due to the lower salaries—employees made £6000 a year less than
workers in other refineries did. The changes proposed by the company would
have further reduced members’ payouts by an average £10,000 a year. In 2013,
the union was caught off guard during a dispute involving a former union orga-
nizer. A third of the union members individually agreed to terms that included
no strikes for three years, no further full-time union conveners, a one-time
£15,000 payout and an enhanced employer contribution to the pension scheme
in return for acceptance of worsening terms and conditions of employment in
the coming years.
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Third Party Intervention in the Dispute
Acas was acting as a third party in the conciliation process for both disputes.
Conciliation talks held at Acas offices over two days in 2008 prior to the strike
taking place, involved discussion of issues of safety and integrity of the refin-
ery site. However, the parties did not come to an agreement with respect to
the underlying issue of the dispute—i.e., reduced employer contributions to
the pension scheme and the strike took place four days after these talks Acas
proactively offered assistance to both parties in pursuing an agreement. Even-
tually, the agreement was reached. Conversely, in 2013 the trade union formally
asked the employer to involve Acas in the dispute resolution process. Despite
their initial reluctance to do so, they were eventually persuaded to attend the
talks at Acas. However, the employer attended these talks with no intention to
resolve the conflict and in fact they walked out of these negotiations and also
denied elected union representatives time-off to meet Westminster government
ministers in London. Furthermore, the employer initiated a lockout, threatened
permanent plant closure and capitalized on a trade union representative’s sus-
pension (based on an independent political scandal) to defeat trade union’s
organized action in the workplace.
In both disputes, Acas was involved prior to the strike and lockout taking
place. In 2008, Acas helped parties reach an agreement on issues of safety
and integrity, although the key issue underlying the collective conflict was not
solved. In 2013, Acas did their best to help both parties reach an agreement
but the conciliation talks fail ed because one of the parties was alleged to have
entered the talks without any intention to solve the conflict.
The Scottish refinery case was derived from the following sources: Lyon (2017),
Arrowsmith (2008), Balakrishnan (2008), BBC (2013, 2014), McAlpine
(2013), Peev and Allen (2013) and Seymour (2013). We can contrast this case
with our own recent experience of the UCU-UUK pensions dispute. The first
and second authors of this chapter took part in the industrial action to defend a
guaranteed pension. The industrial action started before Acas was involved. In
this case the union was more proactive (compared to the UUK) in trying to use
collective conciliation to solve the conflict. With the help of Acas, the UCU and
UUK eventually reached an interim agreement and therefore a further round of
industrial action that had been provisionally announced was instead cancelled.
14.1 Introduction
According to Acas, a state-founded mediation body with a mission to facilitate the
resolution of employment conflicts in Great Britain, an organizational or workplace
conflict is defined as ‘discontent arising from a perceived clash of interests and may
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be collective or individual, involving action such as a strike, raising a grievance or
taking disciplinary measures’ (Dix, Forth, & Sisson, 2008). According to Podro and
Suff (2009), collective conciliation to settle such organizational conflicts has been a
characteristic of British industrial relations for more than a century. Other forms of
collective conflict management are collective mediation and arbitration, however our
findings highlighted that collective conciliation is the dominant form of collective
dispute resolution and the other two mechanisms are comparatively less used in
the UK. For instance, our primary data collection from practitioners highlighted
that mediation is seen by key stakeholders (i.e. organizations and trade unions) as a
‘halfway house’ and hence not a preferred option.
The overall pattern of organizational conflicts in the UK has changed over recent
years showing a decline in collective disputes (see Fig. 14.1 for the number of stop-
pages and Fig. 14.2 for the number of working days lost, respectively). Our primary
data suggests that Acas deals with 850 collective disputes on an annual basis in recent
years. This relatively low number compared to previous years is not surprising since
trade unions in the UK have been losing power since Margaret Thatcher came into
power in 1979. Interestingly, the post-Thatcher governments have also been initiating
legislative amendments that restrict the activities of trade unions in the UK. Several
laws have been enacted to this end, such as allowing a union to be sued, introducing
specific balloting rules prior to strike action (reducing balloting because of threshold
requirements), and proscribing secondary and unofficial actions, all considered as
making it more difficult to strike (Dix, Forth, & Sisson, 2008). For instance, the
New Labour’s first white paper on Fairness at Work also sought to weaken the trade
unions (Dix et al., 2008).1 Apart from these state-initiated changes other factors have
also affected employment relations, including the cyclical pattern of economic activ-
ity, changes in the distribution of employment, weakened trade unions in terms of
density and bargaining coverage, an increase in HR professionalism, trade liberal-
ization and globalization (Dix et al., 2008; Dix & Barber, 2015). Comparing disputes
among different industries, Heery and Nash (2011) reported that health, local govern-
ment, education, manufacturing and central government to be the most dispute-prone
sectors.
Furthermore, the number and strength of works councils, commonly referred to
as joint consultative committees (JCC’s) in Great Britain, has also been steadily
declining; though at a slower rate (Adam, Purcell, & Hall, 2014). The most dramatic
JCC declines were experienced in the finance, wholesale, retail, hotel and restaurant
industries (Van Wanrooy, Bewley, Bryson, Forth, Freeth, Stokes, & Wood, 2013).
More importantly, JCC’s are criticized for not engaging in any meaningful consul-
tation with employees. Instead, they are described as ‘communicators of decisions
that had already been taken by management, rather than as bodies engaged in active
consultation’ (Hall, Hutchinson, Purcell, Terry, & Parker, 2011) and even the ICE
Regulations2 have not enhanced the practice of active, joint consultation via works
1The level of unionisation has fallen from 12.6 million registered members in 1980 to 6.9 million
in 2016 (Certification Officer, 2016).
2Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations—introduced in the UK in 2005.
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Fig. 14.1 Number of workplace stoppages per year in the UK (since 1997). Based on ONS (2018).
The data for 2018 is up to the end of January
Fig. 14.2 Number of working days lost (in thousands) in the UK (since 1997). Based on ONS
(2018). The data for 2018 is up to the end of January
councils (Van Wanrooy et al., 2013). Therefore, works councils/JCCs are unlikely to
participate in collective dispute processes because of a significant narrowing of their
agenda and role, in contrast to the important role played by works councils in other
European countries like Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands, amongst others.
Unsurprisingly, against this employment relations backdrop, statistics for offi-
cial strikes show very low averages when compared with historical data (see
Fig. 14.1) whereas individual employment claims to Employment Tribunals (ETs)
have increased (apart from a minor decrease—see below).
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This pattern of an increasingly individualized employment relationship may indi-
cate on the one hand an ‘individualization phenomenon’ (Dix et al., 2008) whilst on
the other hand, it reflects unions’ decline of power and their new strategy to enforce
and protect existing rights established by legislation (Dix et al., 2008). Nevertheless,
the recent growth in multiple ET cases involving a single issue (or a set of issues)
affecting a number of people in the same workplace or organization suggests the
continuing importance of collective issues (Dix & Barber, 2015). The rise of multi-
ple ET cases is heavily influenced by large scale disputes, primarily as a union-led
tactic to change or maintain control in negotiations. There was a short-term decline
in ET claims by individuals when tribunal fees were introduced in 2013 (Dix &
Barber, 2015). However, these fees were abolished in July 2017 given a Supreme
Court ruling (Renaudon, 2017) and in the proceeding month’s tribunal claims for
individual cases showed a 100% increase.
In this chapter, we discuss the collective conciliation and mediation practices in
the UK. It is worth pointing out that the same employment law applies to private and
public sectors in the UK and hence the same collective conciliation and mediation
system is used in both sectors.
14.2 Characteristics of the System
The existing mediation model in the UK was decided in 2002, when new employment
legislation was enacted (principally the Employment Act of 2002 and Dispute Resolu-
tion Regulations of 2004). Against the theoretical backdrop of the 3R model of work-
place mediation (Bollen, Euwema, & Munduate, 2016), the British dispute resolution
system can be characterized as a predominantly voluntarist approach to collective
conciliation and mediation (Latreille, 2011; Saundry, Bennett, & Wibberley, 2013).
The employment law in the UK does not impose either conciliation or mediation on
disputing parties and the trade union can call for strike action if its members support
it without going through collective conciliation or mediation first. If disputing parties
do decide to take advantage of third party dispute resolution the most frequent port
of call would be Acas. This is state-supported organization almost entirely funded
by the government and acts impartially in providing a range of best practices and
dispute resolution services (Dix & Oxenbridge, 2004). The Labour Relations Agency
(LRA) is the equivalent body in Northern Ireland. Specifically, the Trade Union and
Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act TULRCA 1992s 210 establishes the follow-
ing: “where a trade dispute exists or is apprehended Acas may, at the request of
one or more parties to the dispute or otherwise, offer the parties to the dispute its
assistance with a view to bringing about a settlement”. Therefore, Acas may be part
of the mediation process depending on the will of the parties involved and Acas
involvement is not compulsory in collective disputes (Podro & Suff, 2009). Any of
the disputing parties can request help from Acas or they can also jointly approach
Acas in seeking help to resolve the dispute (Bond, 2011). In Acas’ 2016 collective
conciliation evaluation survey 89% of the total surveyed participants reported that
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their organizations had a formal procedure for dealing with collective conflicts in
place. Of this, 69% indicated that in case of failure to agree, their formal procedure
included a referral to Acas (Booth, Clemence, & Gariban, 2016).
Acas distinguishes between collective conciliation, mediation and arbitration
mechanisms. Collective conciliation is defined as “talks aimed at resolving disputes
between representative groups (most typically trade unions) and employers—facil-
itated by an independent third party” (Podro & Suff, 2009) and Acas emphasizes
that the parties themselves decide the outcome and it primarily helps them find com-
mon ground and move forward. Collective mediation according to Acas refers to
“making recommendations to attempt to resolve the dispute” (Podro & Suff, 2009)
which parties have to consider. Collective mediation is pursued if collective concili-
ation has not been successful and the parties are still committed to settle the conflict
without the use of coercive action (i.e., work stoppages, strikes or lockouts). Our
primary data highlights that issues that escalate to collective mediation include pro-
cedural deficiencies, misuse of the law, dismissal of trade unions representatives etc.
In terms of role expectations of conflicting parties (Bollen et al., 2016), they will
agree on the terms of reference before mediation begins. The role of Acas is focused
on offering recommendations aimed at settling the dispute, and parties are encour-
aged to accept these recommendations. Finally, Acas defines collective arbitration
as a process whereby the parties are given a written decision, which they accepted to
implement in advance, and the dispute formally concludes when both parties agree
on the final terms of reference.
In terms of relations between the disputing parties and a neutral third party (Bollen
et al., 2016) like Acas—it is considered that conciliation and mediation are appro-
priate means of collective conflict resolution only after the involved parties have
exhausted all possibilities of solving the conflict by themselves or if the circum-
stances are so adverse that the parties agree they are in need of assistance from a
third party to solve their conflict. Externally-provided alternative dispute resolution,
such as by Acas, is expected to help solve most disputes, although it might not be
suitable in all cases (Gibbons, 2007). For instance, large organizations usually rely
on extensive internal dispute resolution procedures involving internal or bought-in
mediation expertise. This approach to dispute resolution by larger organizations is
primarily relevant because in heavily unionized workplaces, conflict is likely to occur
and be resolved via direct negotiation with unions. Furthermore, our interview with
Acas’ chief conciliator revealed that organizations often deal with disputes internally
because they ‘…are relationship-based rather than terms and conditions of employ-
ment…’ Therefore, they would be very unlikely to resolve conflicts by immediately
resorting to Acas procedures because trade unions use balloting process or ballot
results as a key negotiation tactic to threaten action. This increases their bargaining
power without actually initiating action (Van Wanrooy et al., 2013). This negotiation
advantage would be lost if third parties like Acas were involved at the outset because
both organizational and trade union policy prohibits industrial action if a dispute
is to be referred to an outside body for collective conciliation or mediation (Bond,
2011; Molloy, Legard, & Lewis, 2003; Van Wanrooy et al., 2013). For instance, users
of the Acas services reported relying on bargaining processes (81%) and escalating
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disputes to more senior personnel members (68%) prior to Acas involvement. In fact,
in more recent times an increase was reported in the use of the threat of industrial
action (an increase to 42% in 2016 from 26% in 2012) before ACAS was involved
in the dispute resolution process (Booth et al., 2016).
Nevertheless, the latest WERS (Workplace Employment Relations Study) data
highlights that the proportion of workplaces with internal collective dispute proce-
dures fell from 40% in 2004 to 35% in 2011 and only two-thirds (66%) of workplaces
with a collective dispute procedure actually used it (Van Wanrooy et al., 2013)—this
is attributed primarily to falling unionization levels. Two thirds of organizations
(68%) have provisions for referral to external bodies in their internal collective dis-
pute policies (ibid) and Acas remains the most popular external body referred to in
collective disputes (in comparison to independent mediators, employer associations
etc.). Furthermore, the most common use of Acas in collective dispute resolution is
for conciliation (37%) followed by arbitration (25%)—while only 9% of the referrals
were for collective mediation (ibid). In 2014–15 there were 1371 cases of collective
conciliation but only 19 arbitrations (Corby, 2015).
Apart from Acas, the disputing parties can turn to a wide range of other organiza-
tions, including advisory bodies such as Citizens Advice Bureau and members of the
Civil Mediation Council. There are also private organizations ranging from lawyers
and consultants, to dedicated ADR and mediation organizations such as the ADR
Group, CEDR (Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution) and Mediation UK (Podro
& Suff, 2005). Practitioners in our sample noted that lack of negotiation experience
of key stakeholders in the dispute places the onus of explaining the basics of the
process on third party conciliators.
In terms of public vs private sector organizations, Acas research suggests that the
public sector has involved ACAS in their dispute resolution to a lesser extent than the
private sector (Dawe & Neathey, 2008; Podro & Suff, 2009; Ruhemann, 2010). The
less frequent use of collective conciliation and mediation by public service organiza-
tions is puzzling given that up to 83% of the public sector workplaces have collective
bargaining compared to only around 14% in the private sector (Podro & Suff, 2009).
With over two-thirds of industrial actions, the public sector is also considerably more
strike prone than the private sector (Heery & Nash, 2011). Nevertheless, Acas has
provided their conciliation services in the railways, London Underground, colleges
and universities, the NHS and fire brigade, to name a few examples. Overall, lower
involvement of Acas in public sector collective disputes can be attributed to the fact
that conciliation may sometimes be seen as a willingness to compromise by typi-
cally strong public sector unions. Unsurprisingly, the recent 2016 evaluation survey
highlighted that the majority of organizations using collective conciliation are from
the private sector (65%), whereas organizations from public sector comprised a total
of 26% of disputes and voluntary/not-for-profit organizations accounted for 9% of
disputes (Booth et al., 2016).
Acas involvement varies across individual versus collective disputes. Acas pro-
vides free conciliation for both collective and individual disputes (the latter is free
only in relation to alleged infringement of employment rights) (Corby, 2015). In con-
trast, Acas provision of mediation for individual conflicts is for a fee. Acas can also
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offer mediation for collective disputes and this service is provided by an independent
panel of mediators.
In terms of the extent of the use of the conflict resolution system in the UK, employ-
ers are increasingly choosing conciliation to resolve workplace conflict. Dix and
Oxenbridge (2004) have summarized the volume of collective conciliation requests
in the 1974–2003 period. They observed a peak in conciliation requests between
1976 and 1978 at more than 3000. The request for collective conciliation fell sub-
stantially in the 1980s, most likely due to sectoral and legislation changes to union
powers. However, despite this the demand for collective conciliation remained steady
between 1990 and 2002 at approximately 1300 requests. The most recent data shows
that the demand for collective conciliation slightly decreased to 1054 requests in
2010/2011, but it increased again to 1372 requests in 2014/2015 (Booth et al., 2016).
Most frequently, these recent disputes were about pay (an issue on 46% of disputes),
followed by other terms of employment, such as pensions, annual leave, etc. (26% of
disputes), recognition of a trade union (18%), changes in working practices (9%), and
redundancy (5%). In terms of the parties involved, the recent survey about the concil-
iation of collective disputes reports only cases that involve employers (management)
and trade union representatives (Booth et al., 2016).
Evaluation of Stakeholders on the System
An attitudinal study on trade union officers highlighted that trade union officials
were somewhat ambivalent about the differences between collective mediation and
conciliation (Bond, 2011). This suggests a lack of awareness of how these respective
Acas services are distinctive from a stakeholder perspective, a point we also observed
in our primary data. More importantly, the current system was evaluated as effective
because it not only has the potential to bring the parties back to the negotiating
table but additionally the use of a neutral third party can help better manage the
emotional undercurrents of the dispute. Trade union officials suggested that they
would turn to the third party for help either when they wanted to make their position
stronger or when they felt their position was weak with respect to the employers. In
these circumstances they would turn to third parties so as to put more pressure on
management to move towards their proposed solution.
Interestingly, all our participants, including trade union representatives, strongly
agreed that the voluntarist approach to dispute resolution in the UK worked given the
overall industrial relations climate. Finally, our primary data also suggests that due to
the recent Trade Union Act of 2016 trade unions were engaging in more consultative
balloting (due to increased ballot threshold requirements) and therefore approaching
ACAS at earlier stages of collective disputes as compared to the past.
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14.3 Characteristics of the Mediators or Facilitators
and the Third Party Procedures
The collective conciliation and mediation processes will be characterized by the par-
ticular style of conciliation and mediation involved. There are different models of
conciliation and mediation, mainly based on facilitative, evaluative, transformative,
transactional and directive approaches (Acas, 2013). Facilitative mediation, oper-
ationalized in almost identical terms as conciliation, is the process in which the
mediator is in charge of the process, asks questions but does not give advice or pro-
vide solutions, and it is the most common approach among the UK-based mediators
(Saundry et al., 2013). The mediators we interviewed follow the Scottish Mediation
Code of Practice, which does not dictate a form of mediation, though they suggested
the facilitative approach as the most common approach in most workplaces. How-
ever, our participants also highlighted that in reality most mediators tend to draw
on a range of approaches during different stages of the dispute resolution process in
order to facilitate a resolution.
The users of Acas collective conciliation function have also identified different
conciliation styles, ranging from the “go-between” to “proactive” style. The “go-
between” conciliators were characterized as those who were mainly conveying mes-
sages but did not explain the underlying factors that influenced each party’s position.
In contrast, the “proactive” conciliators were perceived to not only be conveying the
messages but also using tactics to make the involved parties think of solutions by
presenting options or pointing towards areas of agreement in order to facilitate a
settlement (Dix & Oxenbridge, 2004; Molloy et al., 2003). Needless to say, the vast
majority of parties preferred the proactive conciliation style. There is also evidence
that some conciliators tend to adapt their style to different people or stages of the
conciliation process, which was classified as an “adaptive” conciliation style (ibid).
We discuss about how the conciliation and mediation work in more detail later on in
this chapter.
Collective conciliators are led by the chief conciliator and are based in offices
across England, Wales, and Scotland. They help parties settle conflicts in both local
and national disputes (Podro & Suff, 2009). There are several organizations that are
positioning themselves as the register for mediators. Our specialist mediator intervie-
wees, who were all working independent from Acas, were registered with Scottish
Mediation, but across the UK there is also CEDR, UK Mediation and others, though
CEDR is likely the biggest and best established. Importantly, all these organizations
deal with all forms of mediation, and a large proportion of individuals who are reg-
istered with them do not actually practice or do so rarely. Therefore, it is difficult to
establish how many mediators there are in the UK.
In terms of collective conciliation in particular, the conciliators have on aver-
age of eight years of experience, with almost one third having more than 10 years
of experience as of March 2007. Approximately one in ten work exclusively on
collective conciliation. Podro and Suff (2009) report that conciliator behaviors and
techniques used are more important in determining the success of conciliation than
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the characteristics of the dispute at hand (e.g., a threat of strike, type of conflict etc.).
Particularly effective behaviors for successful collective conciliation outcomes are
proactivity in seeking agreement (e.g., making a judgement about what is appropri-
ate in a given situation), availability when needed outside the meeting and beyond
established working hours, the establishment of conciliation rules and boundaries,
and trustworthiness (Booth et al., 2016; Dix & Oxenbridge, 2004; Podro & Suff,
2009).
Another important characteristic of mediators and conciliators is the one of inde-
pendence and impartiality conceptualized in terms of conciliators showing they did
not have a vested interest in the terms of the agreement and clarifying they were not
negotiating on behalf of any of the parties involved (Bond, 2011; Dix & Oxenbridge,
2004; Molloy et al., 2003). Both mediators and policy makers from our sample
highlighted very strongly the importance of impartiality and how this is the key
determining characteristic of the success of collective conciliation and mediation in
the UK.
Our primary data also highlighted that the impartiality of mediators was guaran-
teed further by the fact that the mediators are not specifically affiliated to any trade
union or employer which our participants saw as being fundamental to their role.
There is no formal/state regulation of the mediation profession at present and
individuals can practice as mediators without any specific training. However, this
might change in the future since organizations such as CEDR and Scottish Medi-
ation are working to change these practices. Organizations with internal mediation
schemes most frequently resort to their HR team for internal mediation who are for-
mally trained by external providers, oftentimes by Acas (Latrielle, 2011). Our find-
ings highlighted that Acas provides comprehensive training to its own conciliation
staff, and on occasion also offers advice and support to other countries’ conciliation
services.
Independent mediators whom we interviewed suggested that when they were
asked to mediate in a workplace, they were usually paid by the employer. Charges
for Acas’ services, with respect to both collective conciliation and mediation, was
addressed in the earlier section (see the ‘Characteristics of the system’).
Evaluation by Stakeholders of the Facilitators/Mediators and Third Party Procedures
A key finding of this project was the degree of trust placed in the competence of Acas
as a viable and reliable third party for dispute resolution purposes. Second, our trade
union participants highlighted that long-standing relationships with local mediators
and regional Acas offices facilitated trust during conflict resolution processes. In fact,
Acas sees this as part of their stakeholder engagement policy—i.e. ‘maintaining con-
tact with the trade union representatives…and also the companies’ human resource
directors…’ (Interview with Acas’ chief conciliator). These relationships were fur-
ther facilitated by organizations and unions involving Acas in setting up recognition
agreements as well as involving Acas in analyzing the overall employment rela-
tions climate in the organization through a ‘diagnostics workshop’ that also helped
highlight any ancillary issues that might have cropped up during the conciliation pro-
cess (ibid). Interestingly both management and trade union officials felt that Acas
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representatives were ‘on their side’ despite Acas openly and ‘jealously guard(ing)
(their) impartiality… because if we bias towards one side or the other our value goes
out of the window’ (Interview with Acas’ chief conciliator). This suggests an open
and trusting relationship (above and beyond specific trade disputes) that facilitates
conversations between Acas representatives and respective managerial and union
reps. All our mediator participants came across as very passionate, enthusiastic and
socially integrated in the local employment relations context.
14.4 Description of the Facilitation and/or Mediation
Process
Given the voluntarist arrangements predominant in the UK, Acas has no power to
force parties to cooperate or impose a solution for disputes. Our interview with
Acas’ chief conciliator highlighted that disputing parties ‘bring in Acas on a volun-
tary basis… we encourage the parties to exhaust their internal procedures on disputes
before getting us involved…’.Therefore, the collective conciliation process usually
starts with the “failure to agree” at the end of internal bargaining suggesting an
ongoing conflictual relationship between both parties. The recent collective concili-
ation survey suggests that in 31% of the surveyed cases, Acas got involved after the
parties had negotiated for 1–3 months and in 28% of the cases from 4–6 months.
Only in 8% of the cases had Acas became involved after the parties had negotiated
on their own for more than a year (Booth et al., 2016). Most frequently, Acas is
likely to get involved after the disputing parties have made several attempts to solve
a dispute, followed by situations in which the parties have stopped communicating
or have reached a deadlock or a complete impasse (Booth et al., 2016; Ruhemann,
2010). Importantly, the majority of conciliation users on both sides of the collective
dispute felt that involving Acas earlier in their negotiation process would not have
been beneficial to reaching an eventual agreement because they felt it was important
to utilize their mutually agreed conflict resolution procedures first. This once again
underscores the importance, and stakeholder buy-in, of voluntarist arrangements in
the UK.
Conciliation talks may take place on neutral territory such as Acas offices and
involve different types of meetings (as explained below). According to Dix and
Oxenbridge (2004), the only mandatory requirement imposed on both parties in the
collective conciliation process is that they are willing to talk to each other. These
authors found that the conciliation process is most frequently initiated jointly by
both management and trade union (47%), by trade union alone (28%), by employer
alone (14%), and by Acas (11%). An overall impression of both parties seems to be
that showing willingness to use conciliation conveys a positive message to the other
party (Molloy et al., 2003). Our participants also highlighted that the success of the
collective conciliation process depended on disputing parties’ willingness to engage
in third party dispute resolution in the first place.
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A typical conciliation meeting will start with a pre-conciliation stage in which
the conciliator’s terms of reference are agreed by all disputing parties beforehand to
ensure everyone has clear expectations of what the conciliator is asked to do. The
conciliator will then meet each party in a separate meeting to hear both sides of the
story, to establish what the factors underpinning the dispute are, and find out what
each party hopes to achieve from the conciliation process. A joint meeting (or a series
of joint meetings) with all disputing parties will follow in which the conciliator will
ask the parties to share their evidence with each other without interruptions in order
to explore possible solutions to the dispute (Saundry et al., 2013). At the end of this
meeting, the conciliator will also summarize and record in writing the main areas
of agreement and disagreement in order to plan the next stages of the conciliation
process.
Based on the collected information, the conciliator will start encouraging commu-
nication between the parties, shifting the focus from the past to the future and looking
for constructive solutions. The conciliator will encourage joint problem-solving by
the parties and building and writing an agreement. Upon reaching an agreement, the
conciliator will bring a copy of the agreed statement that both parties will need to
sign. In case of no agreement, anything that has been said during the conciliation
cannot be used in future proceedings (Acas, 2013). In the case of no resolution our
participants also highlighted that all material revealed during the collective concilia-
tion process is confidential. If the conflict cannot be solved through either collective
conciliation or mediation, the disputing parties can opt for collective arbitration,
which will lead to an outcome both parties must, in most cases, adhere to. This last
option is very rarely utilized in the UK and our participants confirmed that collective
arbitration implied a complete loss of negotiation power and signaled conceding their
position in the dispute. Interestingly, they also highlighted that collective arbitration
undercuts the potential of building long-standing, trust-based relationships between
management and trade unions.
Another option is the cooling down period whereby the parties would go back to
their constituent members for consultation and work on any future plan of action. For
the trade union representatives, this might include a possibility of strike or industrial
action.
In the case of collective arbitration, the collective conciliator draws up the key
terms of reference. The next stage involves the appointment of the arbitrator by Acas
from a panel of outside experts, so that Acas can preserve its neutrality and not become
involved in actual adjudication. The arbitrator then consults all relevant documents
regarding the case after which a hearing is held for all parties to present the key
points of their case as well as answering any questions raised by the opposing party.
After questioning from the arbitrator, the parties present their closing statements.
The arbitrator then deliberates on the evidence and statements presented and sends
a written award statement to the Acas, that after due scrutiny is forwarded to the
concerned parties (Corby, 2015).
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Evaluation by Stakeholders of the Mediators and Mediation Process
Our findings suggest that the trade union representatives are happy with how the
current mediation process allows them flexibility and stakeholder autonomy. Trade
union participants as well as professional mediators in our focus group, despite com-
ing from different parts of Scotland, already knew each other and stressed how these
longstanding, informal relationships facilitated formal dispute resolution process.
Our findings suggested that trade unions are more knowledgeable in regards to col-
lective conflict resolution than the employers are, mainly because trade unions are
organized and train their representatives when they recognize a knowledge gap to
deal with the conflict resolution appropriately, whereas the employers are not. It was
further added that many times HR advisors in charge of managing the employers’
role in a trade dispute resolution process would not have any experience of dispute
resolution or had not had to deal with one in years. Therefore, it was argued that con-
ciliators find it easier to deal with trade union representatives than the employers’
representatives. It was overall suggested that ‘organized workplaces (i.e., unionized)
are much more effective than unorganized workplaces’. In relation to the process,
one trade union representative suggested that there is ‘a misconception… a long-
held sort of myth that the trade unions are out there somehow to wreck industry…
nothing could be further from the truth… if the industries are wrecked, then it is
our members who are losing their jobs… what is our biggest role is trying to stop
management self-destroying their own industries to a certain degree’. In the discus-
sion, this was interpreted as trade unions having a positive overall attitude towards
using collective conciliation as means to help resolve a collective conflict in the
workplace. As mentioned above, in case of no agreement as a result of conciliation
process, the collective arbitration was not the preferred route to resolving disputes
in largely voluntarist industrial relations context.
14.5 Effectiveness of the System
The ACAS survey data suggests that the overall satisfaction with the Acas’ concil-
iation service has been high over time, both from the management and employee
representatives’ points of view (Booth et al., 2016; Dawe & Neathey, 2008; Dix &
Oxenbridge, 2004; Molloy et al., 2003). According to the recent collective concili-
ation survey, a total of 76% of Acas users reported a successful outcome compared
to 81% as reported in 2012. Across the smaller sub-set of users who did not report a
resolution of their dispute, 91% of them acknowledged that their appointed concil-
iator could not have done more to bring about a successful settlement (Booth et al,
2016). A total of 91% of agreements reached during the conciliation were imple-
mented fully and in 76% of successful cases it was perceived that the implemented
agreement resolved the conflict. Our primary findings also suggest that the trade
union representatives, mediators and policy makers all agree that the current system
is effective and importantly, should remain voluntary.
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When the users of collective conciliation were surveyed about their experience in
2007, a total of 89% of employee representatives and 82% of managers were satisfied
with the collective conciliation service received. Customers have also noted that Acas
either solved or made progress towards a settlement in 90% of the cases. A total of
87% of customers would recommend the service or use it again and. The recent Acas
evidence shows that both employers and trade unions rated conciliators the highest
(a score of 5 out of 5) on how well they listened to them, remained impartial, estab-
lished rapport with them and presented issues in neutral language. Furthermore, a
total of 84% of the employers and 90% of the trade union participants in the recent
survey strongly agreed that their conciliator was trustworthy (Booth et al., 2016).
The economic arguments underlying collective conciliation and mediation
schemes provided by Acas are quite strong. Research suggests that collective con-
ciliation has net economic benefits of £147.8 million with only £1.8 million of net
cost. As such, collective conciliation is the second most effective Acas service in
terms of benefit/cost ratio, only preceded by E-learning (Urwin & Gould, 2016). The
recent data also suggests that Acas’ intervention in collective conflicts in relation to
14 key collective disputes across 2013–2014 and 2014–2015, respectively, led to a
net economic impact in terms of loss avoided of £255.3 million (Urwin & Gould,
2016).
Overall, the conciliation service was suggested to have sped up the dispute resolu-
tion, it managed to bring both sides closer together and helped avoid industrial action.
Nevertheless, organizations, particularly SMEs where the uptake of collective con-
ciliation is lower, may need more evidence of the benefits of collective conciliation
and mediation in order to use it more frequently for collective conflict resolution.
Evaluation by Stakeholders of the Effectiveness of the Mediation
In line with previous research, our findings suggest that Acas has been achieving a
high level of success in settling collective conflicts. These findings were corroborated
in our interviews whereby our trade union participants suggested that Acas was a
trustworthy and impartial “partner” in helping them negotiate and solve collective
conflicts with employers. Furthermore, policy makers also reported an extremely
high value of Acas’ service for the economy. Specifically, according to Acas’ chief
conciliator, ‘the value of our service is phenomenal… research suggests that for every
pound Acas spends on the service the economy saves £80’.
14.6 Conclusions
Our recommendations from the experts’ point of view can best be summarized as
follows:
1. Collective conciliation by Acas is widely valued. This relative decline in demand
reflects changes to the institutional environment in which it operates, most notably
the decline in trade union membership levels. Acas as an institution continues to
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draw on the expertise of its senior advisors as they offer both collective dispute
resolution and dispute prevention services via in-depth work inside organizations
and through the provision of training.
2. It is important that Acas continue with the internal monitoring and evaluation
of its performance in terms of collective conciliation. It is important that Acas
maximizes its service provision with respect to collective dispute resolution, so
that it continues to operate as the premier conciliation service in Great Britain.
For example, for Acas it is key to increase its penetration rates in intervening in
collective conflicts and proactively looking to get involved in collective disputes.
3. It is key that Acas continues to work with parties on recognition agreements. This
would facilitate early involvement of Acas in workplaces and enable relationship
building at regional levels.
4. Policy makers and providers could do more work if mediation is something
that is seen useful for building effective workplaces. In this respect, it would
be important to explore more what sort of interventions for collective conflict
resolution could be done.
5. In relation to the previous point, it has been noted that we need a greater under-
standing of what we mean by different kinds of interventions. Our findings sug-
gested there was a lack of clarity in terms of how information, consultation,
negotiation and problem solving differ, particularly from the employers’ per-
spective. Acas and other service providers could offer training to employers’
and employees’ representatives to help understand the key terms and possible
interventions better.
6. Finally, it has been suggested that hardly any practicing mediator in the UK
would accept the Acas’ definition of conciliation and mediation in collective
bargaining process. Most people practice facilitative mediation and see concili-
ation as such. As one mediator reflected ‘this issue of terminology relates to the
lack of understanding about what the role of mediator in the facilitative approach
can actually mean…mediation is often seen as a last resort, but it should not be
viewed as such… it is not a last resort, it is something that you look at earlier in
the process.’
Giving the legislative changes in the balloting process in the trade Union Act
of 2016, there will be more demand in trade disputes for collective conciliation.
Therefore, it is important that it remains a free service in order to maintain harmony
in employment relations and efficient dispute resolution.
Even though Britain’s voluntarist approach to employment relations is somewhat
atypical compared to its European counterparts—given the preferences of key stake-
holders, as well as the impartiality of Acas, the current dispute resolution procedures
are working well. Therefore, a more regulated approach to dispute resolution is, in
the current employment relations climate, not called for.
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